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Preface 
The research project on Systems Analysis of Technological and Economic Dynamics at  IIASA is 
concerned with modeling technological and organisational change; the broader economic devel- 
opments that are associated with technological change, both as cause and effect; the processes 
by which economic agents - first of all, business firms - acquire and develop the capabilities 
to generate, imitate and adopt technological and organisational innovations; and the aggregate 
dynamics - at the levels of single industries and whole economies - engendered by the interac- 
tions among agents which are heterogeneous in their innovative abilities, behavioural rules and 
expectations. The central purpose is to develop stronger theory and better modeling techniques. 
However, the basic philosophy is that such theoretical and modeling work is most fruitful when 
attention is paid to the known empirical details of the phenomena the work aims to  address: 
therefore, a considerable effort is put into a better understanding of the 'stylized facts' concern- 
ing corporate organisation routines and strategy; industrial evolution and the 'demography' of 
firms; patterns of macroeconomic growth and trade. 
From a modeling perspective, over the last decade considerable progress has been made on 
various techniques of dynamic modeling. Some of this work has employed ordinary differential 
and difference equations, and some of it stochastic equations. A number of efforts have taken 
advantage of the growing power of simulation techniques. Others have employed more traditional 
mathematics. As a result of this theoretical work, the toolkit for modeling technological and 
economic dynamics is significantly richer than it was a decade ago. 
During the same period, there have been major advances in the empirical understanding. 
There are now many more detailed technological histories available. Much more is known about 
the similarities and differences of technical advance in different fields and industries and there is 
some understanding of the key variables that  lie behind those differences. A number of studies 
have provided rich information about how industry structure co-evolves with technology. In 
addition to  empirical work at  the technology or sector level, the last decade has also seen a 
great deal of empirical research on productivity growth and measured technical advance a t  the 
level of whole economies. A considerable body of empirical research now exists on the facts that  
seem associated with different rates of productivity growth across the range of nations, with the 
dynamics of convergence and divergence in the levels and rates of growth of income, with the 
diverse national institutional arrangements in which technological change is embedded. 
As a result of this recent empirical work, the questions that  successful theory and useful 
modeling techniques ought to address now are much more clearly defined. The theoretical work 
has often been undertaken in appreciation of certain stylized facts that needed to be explained. 
The list of these 'facts' is indeed very long, ranging from the microeconomic evidence concerning 
for example dynamic increasing returns in learning activities or the persistence of particular sets 
of problem-solving routines within business firms; the industry-level evidence on entry, exit and 
size-distributions - approximately log-normal - all the way to  the evidence regarding the time- 
series properties of major economic aggregates. However, the connection between the theoretical 
work and the empirical phenomena has so far not been very close. The philosophy of this project 
is that the chances of developing powerfill new theory and useful new analytical techniques can 
be greatly enhanced by performing the work in an environment where scholars who understand 
the empirical phenomena provide questions and challenges for the theorists and their work. 
In particular, the project is meant to  pursue an 'evolutionary' interpretation of technological 
and economic dynamics modeling, first, the processes by which individual agents and organisa- 
tions learn, search, adapt; second, the economic analogues of 'natural selection' by which inter- 
active environments - often markets - winnow out a population whose members have different 
attributes and behavioural traits; and, third, the collective emergence of statistical patterns, 
regularities and higher-level structures as the aggregate outcomes of the two former processes. 
Together with a group of researchers located permanently a t  IIASA, the project coordinates 
multiple research efforts undertaken in several institutions around the world, organises workshops 
and provides a venue of scientific discussion among scholars working on evolutionary modeling, 
computer simulation and non-linear dynamical systems. 
The research focuses upon the following three major areas: 
1. Learning Processes and Organisational Competence. 
2. Tecll~lological and Industrial Dynamics 
3. Innovatio~l, Competition and A~Iacrodynamics 
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1. Introduction 
During the last decade, scholars have developed a resource-based framework for analyzing 
the behavior and competitive strategy of the firm. This framework (which is also known as the 
theory of core competence, firm capabilities, etc.) was developed by Wernerfeldt (1984), Teece and 
colleagues (Teece 1989, 1988, 1993; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1994) and Prahalad and Hamel 
(1990), among others, largely as a reaction against the dominant "competitive forces" analysis of 
firm strategy.l The resource-based theory of the firm suggests that a business enterprise is best 
viewed as a collection of sticky and difficult-to-imitate resources and capabilities that enable it to 
compete against other firms (Penrose 1959, Barney 1986, Wernerfelt 1 9 ~ 4 ) . ~  Rather than 
optimizing subject to some web of external constraints, the "capabilities" view argues, firms should 
seek to create rents through creating new capabilities that effectively relax such external 
constraints. 
These resources can be physical, such as production techniques protected by patents or 
trade secrets, or intangible, such as brand equity or operating routines. Of particular importance is 
the specificity inherent in such resources: the same characteristics that enable a firm to extract a 
sustainable rent stream from these assets often make it difficult for the firm to "transplant" them 
and utilize them effectively in a new contest. Thus, a firnl that has developed an advantageous 
position is protected to the extent that its capabilities are specific and therefore difficult for others 
The "competitive forces" approach to the analysis of firm strategy is rooted in the neoclassical 
economics of industrial organization, and emphasizes the influence of industry structure on the 
profitability and performance of a firm, whose internal structure and history are of little consequence. 
Nelson (1 991) argues that in neoclassical economics, "Firms facing different markets will behave and 
perform differently, but if the market conditions were reversed, firm behaviors would be too. Where the 
theory admits product dserentiation, different firms will produce different products, but in the theoretical 
literature any firm can choose any niche. Thus there are firm differences, but there is no essential 
autonomous quality to them." (p. 253). 
"The capabilities approach sees value implementing strategic change as being difficult and costly. 
Moreover, it can generally only occur incrementally." (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1994, p. 34). 
to imitate, but this very specificity may constrain the firm's ability to transfer these resources to 
new uses, to apply them in unrelated lines of business, or to sell them in market transactions. 
One area in which firm-specific competencies or capabilities appear to be significant is in 
the management of innovation within the firm. A considerable literature on firm-level dfferences 
in capabilities deals with product innovation. Intrafirm management of process innovation, 
however, has received less attention. Clark and Fujirnoto (1991), as well as other scholars of the 
Japanese automobile industry, note the complementary relationship of process and product 
innovation, but the bulk of their analysis concerns product innovation. 
This paper analyzes the management of new process technologies in the semiconductor 
industry, one in which the relationship between process and product innovation is far stronger than 
is true of automobiles. New process development relies on the replication of complex "routines" 
within a firm, since in many cases, a ne\v manufacturing process is developed in an RRrD facility 
and then transferred to a manufacturing site. Firm-specific differences in the managenlent and 
organization of process innovation appear to be significant and iilfluence performance. 
Immediately below, we develop a conceptual frarne\vork for evaluating the role of firm- 
specific capabilities in the development and introduction of new manufacturing processes. The 
subsequent section establishes the importance for competitive performance of successful 
development and introduction of new nlanufacturing processes in the semiconductor industry, and 
presents data that characterize some of the consequences of poor performance in thls activity. The 
case studies in Section IV provide a more detailed firm-level view of the activities that underpin the 
development and introduction of new manufacturing processes in this industry. The case studies 
suggest some managerial and organizational reasons for differential performance that complement 
the findings of other empirical models of new process introduction in semiconductor 
manufacturing. In Section V, we summarize the important themes that emerge from these case 
studies for the "capabilities view" of the firnl and discuss these and possibilities for hrther 
research in the conclusion. 
II. The Creation and Replication of Firm-Specific Capabilities 
According to Teece et al. (1992), the internal development of capabilities relies on 
. organizational learning. Organizational learning is influenced by the environment of technological 
opportunities, but interfirm differences in skills, management, and organization may produce very 
different rates of learning among firms that are in the same industry and that face the sanle 
opportunity environment. The organizational learning that underpins the internal development of 
capabilities is path-dependent and localized. Development of its capabilities are constrained by a 
firm's current and historic activities, capabilities, and resources, reflecting the irreversibilities 
within this process. In addition, firms are not easily able to develop teclmological or other 
capabilities in markets or products that have little or no relationship to their current portfolio. 
Technological resources are one of the most frequently cited firm-specific capabilities. 
Since these frequently rest on tacit knowledge and are often subject to considerable uncertainty 
concerning their characteristics and performance, they often cannot be purchased through arms- 
length, conventional contracts (Mowery, 1983). Other forms of firm-specific capabilities include 
knowledge of specific markets or user needs; idiosyncratic, firm-specific "routines," such as 
decisionmaking and problem-solving techniques; management information systems;3 and con~plex 
networks for handling the marketing and distribution of products that include procedures for the 
systematic capture and analysis of user feedback. But empirical evaluation of the influence of 
The point-of-sale data collection and distribution systen~s of the U.S. discount store chain Wal-Mart is 
one esarnple of an organizationally embedded system that has proven to be very difficult for competitors 
to imitate. 
these factors on firms' behavior requires more detailed characterization of firm-specific knowledge, 
rather than measures that rely solely on inputs, such as R&D or marketing expenditures. 
Ln the next bvo sections of this paper, we attempt an analytic description and 
characterization of the nature and influence of firm-level capabilities in new process introduction. 
The introduction of a new manufacturing process into high-volume production of  semiconductor 
components provides an excellent example of the costs and complexities of the intrafirm 
"replication" of  critical capabilities. As we note below, the complexities associated with the 
introduction of  a new manufacturing process are nearly as forbidding as  those associated with 
transferring mature manufacturing technologies among commercial production facilities within a 
single firm. 
Ill. New Process Introduction in Semiconductor Manufacturing 
The speed and effectiveness with whch new products are developed and introduced into 
large-volume production is an important influence on competitive performance in a number of 
manufacturing industries. For example, ncw product developlllent figured prominently in recent 
studies of international competitiveness in automobiles (Womack, et al., 1990; Clark and Fujirnoto, 
1991). There are good reasons, however, to suspect that the management of new process 
introduction is if anything even more important to competitive performance in semiconductors than 
is true in automobiles or most other manufacturing i n d ~ s t r i e s . ~  Semiconductor manufacturing 
processes are among the most complex commercial production processes in industry. The 
Pisano and Wheelwright (1995) argue that "...manufacturing-process innovation is becoming an 
increasingly critical capability for production innovation." Although these authors assen that "Few 
managers of high-technology companies view manufacturing as a primary source of competitive 
advantage," we found no evidence to suppon this statement in our fieldwork. Indeed, virtually all of the 
corporate managers in the U.S. and non-U.S. firms included in our study were deeply concerned with 
improving their management of the development and transfer of manufacturing process technologies, and 
devoted considerable resources to these activities. 
fabrication of an integrated circuit with feature sizes and linewidths of less than one nlicron 
requires more than one hundred steps (e.g., patterning, coating, baking, etching, cleaning, etc.). 
Underpinning the principal steps are hundreds of individual manufacturing operations. The 
development of many of these steps is based on art and know-how rather than science; they are not 
well-understood and easily replicated on different equipment or in different facilities; and they 
impose demanding requirements for a particle-free manufacturing environment. 
Product innovation in semiconductors depends on process innovation to a much greater 
exqent than is true of automobiles. The introduction of a new automobile requires substantial time 
and investment to manufacture dies and tooling for stamping and forming body parts and 
components, but a new model rarely demands significant change in the overall manufacturing 
process. Semiconductor product innovations, on the other hand, often require major changes in 
manufacturing processes, because of the tighter link between process and product characteristics 
that typifies semiconductors. Moreover, imperfect scientific understanding of semiconductor 
manufacturing means that changes in process technologies demand a great deal of experimentation. 
New equipment, with operating characteristics that are not well understood, often must be 
introduced along with a new "recipe," also not well understood, in order to manufacture a new 
product. The complexity of the manufacturing process also means that isolating and identifying 
the causes of yield failures requires considerable time and effort. 
The h a 1  reason to hypothesize that new process introduction plays a more important 
competitive role in semiconductors than automobiles is the nature of competition in the 
semiconductor industry--management of process technology is critical to firm strategy. 
Particularly in "commodity product" segments of the industry like memory chips, a new product 
commands a price premium for a relatively brief period, and being first to market is important to 
profitability. Rapid "ramping" (growth in production volume) of a new product affects the returns 
to the large investments in product development and manufacturing f a ~ i l i t i e s . ~  
Although the intensity of competition and the brevity of product life cycles arguably are 
greatest in the memory segment of the industry, the semiconductor industry overall faces shorter 
product life cycles and greater threats to individual firms' dominance from the entry of producers 
of close substitutes (e.g., the "cloners" of Intel's successful 80386 microprocessor) than is true of 
automobiles. Alvarez (1994) notes that the shrinkage of  these product cycles means that rapid and 
smooth introduction of new manufacturing processes is becoming more and more important to 
competitive performance.6 Indeed, the failure thus far of the Po\\lerPCys challenge to Intel's 
dominance of desktop computers has been directly affected by Motorola's inability to expand 
output of  the PowerPC microprocessor more rapidly. Simultaneously, Intel has relied on rapid 
development and "ramping" of new inanufacturing processes to accelerate its introduction of a 
succession of improved versions of the Pentium and "Pentium Pro" microprocessors, rnaking 
Motorola's challenge even greater.7 Rather than a "capacity race," which was hypothesized to 
characterize US-Japan competition in DRAM manufacture (e.g., Steinmueller, 1982), this 
competition between architectures is driven by capacity utilization, which in turn is a function of 
success in new process introduction. 
j Flaherty (1991) presents a model of capacity expansion races in the production of 64K DRAM memory 
chips that includes firm-specific constraints on capacity espansion and argues for the importance of such 
capacity espansion in the decisions of U.S. to exit the memory segment of the semiconductor industry. 
Although Flaherty identifies firm-specific differences in the "ramping" of new product volumes, she does 
not attempt to explain them. 
According to A.R. Alvarez, the vice president for R&D of Cypress Semiconductor, "Industrial success 
in the year 200 1 will depend as much on the methods by which process development is conducted as it 
will on the results of process development." (Alvarez, 1994, p. 1). 
See Carlton (1995, p. B3), who notes that "...the PorverPC initiative has been hampered ..." by 
"Motorola's inability to quickly produce PowerPC chips in volume quantities," while "...Intel has been 
making such advances in its Pentium technology that it has all but erased the advantage Po\verPC was 
supposed to have in terms of lower price and greater performance." 
A. Semiconductor manufacturing technology 
A brief overview of the technology of semiconductor manufacturing processes will 
illustrate the complexities and importance of careful management of new process development and 
transfer. Semiconductor chips are produced on wafers of silicon by constructing layers of 
insulating and conductive materials in intricate patterns that define the hnction of the integrated 
circuit. Each wafer contains fiom dozens to thousands of identical chips with features as small as 
0.35 pn8 Manufacturing facilities ("fabs") house the ultra-clean manufacturing environments, 
called cleanrooms, that limit particle contamination. The manufacturing process for semiconductor 
devices consists of hundreds of operations that are undertaken on a wide variety of processing 
equipment types. These operations are categorized into broader categories, k n o ~ n  as modules, that 
correspond to the particular set of steps used to perform the manufacturing activities in each area 
of the fab, such as photolithography, etch, implantation, and metallization. The modules currently 
or previously used in the fab represent its manufacturiilg know-how and define its technical 
capabilities. 
The n~icroscopic dimensions of their features and their complex designs mean that particle 
contamination can severely impair the hnctionality of ff ished chips, leading to scrapping, which 
in turn affects the yield of the manufacturing process. There are two tqpes of yield loss in 
semiconductor manufacturing: line yield is the fraction of wafers that survive the manufacturing 
process; die yield refers to the fraction of chips on surviving wafers that pass tests for hnctionality 
and performance at the end of the manufacturing process. Ln some cases, a s  when a wafer contains 
a number of very costly die that are produced through a large number of complex steps, 
manufacturers will aggressively pursue wafer scrapping, which reduces line yield, in order to 
* To provide some sense of the size of these features, Lhe average human hair is about 100 pm in width. 
achieve higher die yield and reduce the number of processing steps camed out on nohnctional 
wafers. 
Although the firms in our study have organized their new process development activities in 
different ways, all of them employ the same general modules, and development and introduction of 
a new manufacturing process requires a common set of steps. Design of new process modules 
typically begins before tlle design of the new product that  ill use them, because a firm's existing 
process capabilities limit the nature of the new product designs that it can produce. In this phase 
of the development of a new process, new steps are developed and refined until they are 
consistently reproducible. Eventually, the new process steps are integrated into a complete process 
flow for which development continues to ivork on problems created by interactions among steps. 
Before the new product can be introduced to the market, it has to undergo a variety of performance 
and endurance tests collectively called qualification. Qualification is followed by a period of 
"ramping" output to commercial volumes. 
A new process requires three types of process modules: existing modules, new modules 
using existing equipment, and new modules using new equipment. All of these modules must be 
integrated to support the new process flow. Although the incorporation of existing modules into 
the new process flow appears to be the simplest of the development activities needed for a new 
process, even this task often encounters unexpected results produced by the interaction of existing 
and new process modules. Developing and integrating new modules is even more difficult. As a 
manager from one of the fabs in our study noted, "Every new module will have at least one major 
problem to solve." In order to develop a new module on existing equipment within a production 
fab, managers must make tradeoffs between the new module's needs for experimentation and 
analysis and the manufacturing requirements of the other production processes. The most difficult 
activity in process development is the development of a new module that uses new equipment. In 
this case, the problems of learning the physical parameters of the process are heightened by the 
need to learn the peculiar characteristics and parameters of the new equipment. 
The challenges associated with developing new modules and incorporating esisting 
modules into new processes are such that carehl planning and coordinated developnlent of product 
and process technology development are essential. For example, if a new process technology is 
introduced for the manufacture of modifications of existing designs, rather than for an entirely new 
product design, the introduction of the new process technology is simplified. Effective technology 
planning should also result in a new process that \vill accommodate as many future product 
generations as possible, using modules that can be incorporated into as many future processes and 
products as possible. This is especially important for modules that require new equipment; their 
high development costs need to be amortized by use in the manufacture of many subsequent 
product generations. Finally, the relationship depicted in Figure 1 indicates that new processes that 
incorporate a high percentage of new steps require more time for their development. Shorter 
development cycles therefore require better planning for the introduction of new products and 
processes, so that each new process utilizes a substantial share of the steps and modules associated 
with its predecessor 
B. Elements of "best practice" in new process development and 
implemen ta tion 
Our field research led us to distinguish at least three general approaches to managing new 
process introduction. In our sample, one group of fabs introduces new processes that are well- 
understood, eshbiting relatively low defect densities at their inception. A second group of fabs 
introduces new processes that are less well-chara~terized,~ and attempts to improve their 
Process characterization refers to the degree to which the firm understands the physical parameters and 
their interactions in the process. A process hat is highly characterized, is well understood and has 
reproducible manufacturing results in all steps. 
performance through learning by doing in the manufacturing fab. A third group of fabs focuses on 
the incremental development and modhication of manufacturing processes, frequently introducing 
new processes and constraining the development of new products to conform to the constraints 
imposed by the development of their manufacturing process technologies. This last group of fabs 
consists mainly of producers of application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) that operate as 
"foundries." 
The uncertainties of many aspects of semiconductor manufacturing mean that most non- 
ASIC producers employ a dedicated development fabrication facility for new process development. 
The "development fab" serves a function in this industry that resembles that of the "pilot plant" in 
the chemicals industry. "Debugging" a new process in a development fab is more effective when 
the development fab resembles the manufacturing fab in as many aspects as possible, particularly 
in the equipment and materials used. Reflecting the complexity of semiconductor manufacturing, 
as \veil as the frequent need to alter production equipment as part of new process introduction, 
differences behveen the development facility and the manufacturing fab in their equipment sets and 
configurations can impede new process introduction. In response to this, a number of the fabs in 
our sample have adopted policies that require that the receiving fab have an equipment set that is 
identical to that on which a new process is developed in the development facility. 
Even stringent requirements for equipment duplication, however, cannot eliminate all 
significant differences between the manufacturing environment and that of the development fab for 
some products or processes. In the case of DRAM products, the differences in manufacturing 
volumes behveen the development and manufacturing facilities of leading producers are so great 
that development fabs cannot fully replicate manufacturing conditions. This factor has contributed 
to the efforts of some DRAM manufacturers to move new processes out of their development fabs 
and into manufacturing more rapidly and at lower levels of process characterization. 
C. Measuring the costs of poor performance in new process 
introduction 
To hrther illustrate the importance of new process introduction for competitive 
performance, we simulate the penalties associated with a poor start with data from the U.C. 
Berkeley Competitive Semiconductor Manufacturing (CSM) study. l o  The losses associated with 
late introduction of a new process relative to one's competitors are largely opportunity costs. They 
include the lost revenues from the periods before the process is introduced, as well as the revenue 
premiums that are foregone because prices fall over the commercial life of a specific device. In 
contrast, the penalties associated with poor starting yields are primarily the higher manufacturing 
costs that result from lower line and die yields. 
Figure 2 shows price trends for four recent DRAM products, from the 256K DRAM to the 
16MB DRAM. The precipitous decline in prices observed here is not restricted to memory 
products, but applies to most semiconductor products. Early innovators enjoy a substantial price 
premium, but as additional firms enter the market and fabs reduce costs through learning, 
production expands and prices fall rapidly. Later entry imposes large penalties in the form of lost 
revenues. 
To see this effect in more detail, consider the case of 4 MB DRAM products. Figure 3 
shows the price path for this product through time, along with the dates at which each of eight new 
4 MB DRAM manufacturing processes \\?ere introduced into manufacturing within the CSM 
sample. Our small sample of DRAM manufacturing producers does not include the earliest 
innovators in this product market and therefore excludes the "first-movers" that obtained very large 
price premiums in 1989. We can estimate the penalty that firms in our sample incurred through 
late entry, however, by calculating the difference between the prices they wvould have obtained in 
lo Funded by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, the CSM study is an interdisciplinary project at U.C. 
Berkeley with the goal of measuring and comparing semiconductor manufacturing performance in fabs 
around the world. 
each period had they been the first to introduce the process, versus the prices obtained when they 
actually entered. For esample, the penalty of delay in the first period of production in our sample 
is the difference between the price of the product in 1989, when the 4MB DRAM was first 
introduced, and the price obtained by the first entrant in our sample in its first period of production. 
The penalty of delay in the firm's second period of production is the price of the product in its 
second period in the market less the price the firm receives in its second period of production, and 
so on. Table 1 presents estimates of the monthly price penalties associated with delayed entry into 
manufacture in the 4 MB DRAM processes in our sample in the left-hand column for each 
process. 
The high costs of delayed entry into a new product market mean that firms face significant 
incentives to be first to market with new products. But early entry has its costs, ivhich may offset 
the higher unit revenues for "good die" that are associated with early entry. The most obvious 
reason to postpone entry is the need for additional time to develop and "debug" a product design or 
the new process sufficiently for volume manufacturing.'' Firms have considerable discretion in the 
estent to which they characterize a new process in developn~ent before transferring it to a high- 
volume manufacturing environment. A poorly characterized process typically suffers serious yield 
problems in the manufacturing facility. 
To illustrate the penalty associated with poor starting yields, we present another 
simulation based on the sample of 4 MB DRAM processes from the CSM study. The basis for 
this simulation is the widely held belief among semiconductor firms that the cost of manufacturing 
a wafer on a particular process is not affected by the number of die on the wafer. Therefore, the 
cost of producing an individual chip, whether it hnctions or not, depends on the wafer size and the 
d e  size. Let the wafer size be A cm2 and the die have an area of o cm2. Then the gross number of 
Our data suggest that problems in process development dominate product design problems in 
delaying entry. 
dice on the wafer x is Ma.12 If we denote the manufacturing cost of a wafer as W, then the unit 
cost per die is 
Now we introduce the influence of yield losses on manufacturing cost. If we let y(r) denote 
the die yield at time t and q denote the number of functional dice produced, then x '  y ( ~ )  = q.13 
Since the good output must bear the cost of yield losses, the manufacturing cost can be represented 
as w' x = c. q, where c is the average variable cost of good output. Thus, the unit cost of 
production, including the cost of yield losses, is 
Equation 2 shows that the additional costs associated with yield losses are not trivial; a 20% loss in 
yield results in a 25% increase in unit cost. 
Using our sample of new 4 MB DRAM processes, we simulate the cost penalties 
associated with the actual yields obtained after the processes are introduced into the manufacturing 
environment. This requires the simplifying assunlption that all the processes have a manufacturing 
cost of $1000 per eight-inch equivalent wafer.14 Using actual process yield data and the assumed 
wafer cost, we simulate the cost penalty associated with poor starting yields. This penalty is 
defined as the additional cost incurred by a producer whose yields are below those of the best of 
l 2  This calculation assumes that all the area on the wafer is utilized by chips. Actually, since the wafers 
are circular and the dice are rectangular, there is some lost area. For our purposes, we ignore the lost 
silicon at the edges of the wafer. 
l3  We assume that yield is a function of time alone to allow for yield improvements. In fact, yield is not 
solely a function of time; its improvement depends on product and process design, process development 
and transfer characteristics, and manufacturing practices (see Hatch and Mowery, 1995). 
l 4  The assumed wafer cost is consistent with the estimated wafer costs reported by Reichelstein and 
Hatch (1993) that are based on data from the firms participating in the U.C. Berkeley CSM project. 
our eight DRAM producers in each period. These penalties are computed only for the processes in 
our sample,15 and the results are presented in Figure 4.16 
Figure 4 shows that the differences in yield and the resulting cost penalties are volatile and 
occasionally large. The average cost of a die, ignoring yield losses, is $15. Thus, the yield penalty 
of almost $14 faced by an early entrant with a poor yield effectively doubles the manufacturing 
cost relative to the process with the best yields. These results show that the penalty for poor yields 
often is substantial in the early operation of a new process, and the variation among firms in cost 
differentials is largest early in the life of the process. The costs of different producers appear to 
converge somewhat over time, although even after three years the differences persist. Comparison 
of the two columns for each manufacturing process in Table 1, hoyvever, makes it clear that the 
penalties associated with late entry dominate those associated Lvith poor starting yields. Time to 
market is critical to competitive advantage in DRAMS and, we believe, in other products. 
Nonetheless, the penalties associated with poor starting yields are considerable. 
D. Modeling the determinants and effects of successful new 
process introduction 
Hatch and Mowery (1995) use data on "defect densities" of new semiconductor 
manufacturing processes to model performance in new process introductions.17 Longitudinal data 
on defect densities in new manufacturing processes point out several interesting characteristics of 
the learning processes that lead to improvement over time (i.e., declines) in defect densities. First, 
consistent with the views of scholars who emphasize the importance of firm-level differences in 
l5 There were many other 4 MB DRAM processes in production during this period that are not in our 
sample, some of which potentially had higher yields than any in our sample. 
l6 One of the processes in the sample began with ex-aordinarily low yields, resulting in a cost 
differential as high as $1465.63 per unit. To better illustrate the cost variation in most of the processes, 
the scale of the figure is chosen such that the early cost penalties of this unusual process are not visible. 
l7 The defect density of a new manufacturing process is simply the number of defects per square 
centimeter on the silicon wafer from which individual semiconductor chips are cut; i t  is inversely 
correlated with die yield. 
capabilities, Table 2 reveals substantial performance differences among manufacturing facilities in 
the U.C. Berkeley CSM database (a group that includes producers of DRAMS and other memory 
products, logic, and ASIC products), measured as either the initial defect density for a new 
manufacturing process (the defect density reported for the first quarter of operation of a process in 
the manufacturing facility) or the average quarterly rate of improvement of defect density. Second, 
the penalties associated with a "poor start," a high defect density, are often very difficult to 
overcome. The data in Figures 5-6 reveal that manufacturing facilities that began with very high 
defect densities in new manufacturing processes found it very difficult to close the gap with the 
facilities that began with much lower defect densities. .Third, manufacturing processes that are 
closer to the "technological frontier," which in this case are associated with smaller linewidths on 
semiconductor chips, display an even more proilounced "poor start" penalty. The data suinrnarized 
in Figure 5 suggest that firms that begin with poor defect densities in submicron line\vidth 
semiconductor manufacturing processes find it much harder to close the performance gap with the 
leaders. Illis result, of course, is precisely \\hat one would expect--labor turnover, technical 
journals, and other sources of interfirm spillovers take time to transmit knowhow anlong 
competitors, and a superior starting point in the most advanced manufacturing processes therefore 
yields more enduring competitive advantages. 
Statistical analysis of new process introduction (Hatch and Mowery, 1995) revealed 
several interesting findings. The rate of improvement or learning associated with a new 
manufacturing process was not solely determined by expansion in volume, but could be increased 
by allocating more engineering resources to the experiments and organized problem-solving 
activities that are necessary to reduce "parametric" defect densities.'* These results supgest that 
l 8  Defects that cause die yield losses can generally be categorized as coming from unwanted particles or 
from exceeding the physical tolerance limits of a manufacturing step. The latter type of defects is 
commonly referred to as parametric processing errors and is a more serious problem in new processes 
whose parameters are not as well understcod as mature processes. 
in semiconductor manufacturing, "learning by doing" is not exogenous, but can be increased by 
management decisions. The allocation of engineering resources to problem-solving activities for a 
new process, however, affects the rate of improvement in other manufacturing processes being 
operated in the same facility. 
Since most new semiconductor manufacturing processes are introduced into facilities that 
are simultaneously operating other, more mature processes, a poorly managed new process 
introduction can have broader effects on a firm's competitive performance. Yields and output of 
both a new product and existing products manufactured with more mature processes may all be 
reduced by an unsuccessful new process introduction. The negative effects of a new process 
introduction on manufacturing performance for existing products thus may increase the costs 
associated with the introduction of a poorly characterized manufacturing process into a 
commercial-volume fab. Because of their complexity, the previous section's simulation analysis 
did not include these costs, but their presence increases the costs and reduces the profits associated 
with a "first-to-market" strategy that it relies on extensive characterization of a new manufacturing 
process in a production fab that is operating older manufacturing proces~es. '~ 
The analysis of management techniques for new process introduction also yielded some 
interesting results. The use of a dedicated development fab was associated with superior 
performance in improving defect densities, and locating this development facility on the same site 
as the high-volume manufacturing facility that was to receive the new process improved 
performance. Finally, identical production equipment in the development and manufacturing 
facilities was associated with better performance. Our model also suggests that there are important 
differences among product classes in the management and. learning behavior associated with new 
l9 The negative effects of new process introduction on existing processes wil l  be higher still when more 
than one new manufacturing process is introduced simultaneously, something that was attempted in 
several of the fabs in the Berkeley CSM study. 
process technologies. As we noted earlier, ASIC producers are more likely to introduce 
incremental modifications of their process technologies much more frequently, and are less llkely to 
utilize development facilities. The "management" variables that \ifere important in explaining 
interfirm differences for our broader sample \yere much less po\verful for this product class. In 
DRAM manufacturing, we find that most of the critical problem-solving and learning associated 
vvith new manufacturing processes takes place in the "first generation" of a new family of DRAMS, 
e.g., the first product design and associated process for a 4MB DRAM. Later "~hrinks'"~ of that 
DRAM product experience fewer problems in process development and transfer. 
Although the statistical analysis revealed some generic practices that contributed to 
superior performance, firm-specific effects remained significant, as a fixed-effects model showed. 
These statistical results are consistent with a view of new process introduction that emphasizes 
interfirm differences in performance, especially in the most advanced products, and that stresses 
the role of management techniques in improving or degrading the smoothness of the transfer and 
the rate of learning. Semi-scale development facilities improve firms' performance in products 
other than ASICs, while significant differences anlong product classes affect firms' new process 
introduction. But considerable firm-specific variance remains unexplained, and requires a more 
detailed examination. In order to examine the sources of these interfirm differences in management 
and performance in greater detail, we undertook case studies of new process introduction in two 
firms in the CSM sample. 
IV. Case studies of management of new process introduction 
This section compares the management by two semiconductor companies of new process 
development and transfer to a conlmercial-volume fab. The comparison of new process 
20 A "shrink" refers to a redesigned chip with a smaller area, which increases die yields and may 
improve chip performance. 
introduction strategies provides a sense of the similarities and differences among semiconductor 
firms in the capabilities and routines used to manage new process introduction. The firms are 
disguised as Supreme Technologies (ST) and Multiplex Electronics (ME). We focus on the 
introduction of one process flow for each company--memory for ST and logic for ME. 
These cases seek to compare the new process introduction strategies of different companies 
facing different market conditions. Some products, such as DRAhlls, are not differentiated 
significantly from one another; competition is driven largely by price. Competition among some 
types of logic devices, such as microprocessors, is driven by the attractiveness and the size of the 
installed base of the hardware architectures and software libraries associated with each-different 
product families are sharply differentiated from one another. These contrasts in product market 
environments may produce different approaches to management of new process introduction. 
Nevertheless, the technical challenges, and therefore, the metrics used to evaluate the success of 
new process introduction-yields and reliability-are consistent across the products of the firms in 
our sample. Furthermore, both firms participate in a number of product markets and neither 
company suggested that its strategy for new process introduction varied markedly across its 
product families. The differences in management of new process introduction among these firms 
thus appear to be largely the result of firm-level, rather than product-level, differences in 
technology and competitive strategies. 
A. Supreme Technologies 
Our first case study examined Supreme Technologies' introduction of a new process for a 
new memory product. The new process presented numerous technical and organizational 
challenges to ST, since it included a very high proportion of new steps and was eventually 
transferred to recipient fab that used wafers of a different diameter than the development fab. Prior 
to undertaking the development and transfer of this process technology, ST had conducted an 
internal study of previous process transfers, and adopted policies to improve its performance and to 
impose greater discipline on modifications in the recipient fab following process transfer. But 
these reforms in ST'S new process introduction policies did not produce a smooth process 
development and transfer. In particular, ST'S plans for new process development were not well 
integrated with its product planning. The result was an overly ambitious project to develop a 
process technology that encountered serious delays, impeding the timely introduction of a 
commercially attractive product. 
Among the new practices adopted by ST in the wake of its internal study were the 
assignment of a hll-time leader to the project; the scheduling of regular meetings among project 
team members and between the team and representatives from other divisions in the company; the 
decomposition of the new process into modules to facilitate transfer to the volume manufacturing 
as each module was completed; the designation of a team in the recipient fab dedicated to the 
process hand-off, and the maintenance of a baseline process that would continue to run in the 
development fab for a year or two after the transfer to a volume fab. ST also attempted to align 
the incentives of engineers in its developmeilt fab more closely with those of engineers and 
managers in the recipient fab, recognizing that this could facilitate a smoother transfer of the 
process technology. The firm sought to create such alignment by rewarding its manufacturing fab 
for accepting the new process, rather than penalizing it for declines in performance or capacity 
utilization in the operation of existing processes. ST brought engineers from the recipient fab to 
the development site in the weeks prior to hand-off, encouraging them to learn the new process and 
accept responsibility for its successhl t ran~fer .~ '  Relative to other firnls we studied, however, 
21 Volume fabs often resist the introduction of new semiconductor processes, since they can cause major 
upheavals, as people are trained on the new process and new equipment is calibrated and deployed. In 
some process steps, technical improvements contained in a new process are "backward compatible" and 
can improve yields of the esisting process flow. The initial net effect nevertheless is negative, with the 
volume fab experiencing yield declines as it "ramps up" the new process to high volume. 
fewer representatives from ST'S recipient fab \yere rotated to its developn~ent fab, and they visited 
the development site for shorter periods of time. 
The new process differed dramatically from that associated with ST's previous advanced 
manufacturing process for memory chips. Of the more than one hundred process steps involved in 
the new manufacturing process, approximately 90% were new, compared with a more typical share 
of 50-55% in a new process. Moreover, several of these new steps and modules, particularly in the 
etch module, had not previously been used in conunercial-volume manufacturing and presented 
serious technical challenges. ST needed the new etch operations to pack more transistors into a 
smaller die area, but this module required new chemical and thermal specifications, as well as 
modifications in the equipment that exceeded the capabilities of currently available technology. ST 
had to enter into a co-development project with its vendor to ensure that the hardware would meet 
the new process specifications. 
ST's development schedule assumed that the firm would ha\fe a baseline process running 
in the development fab t\vo years after top management approved the process development project. 
Eighteen months afier the project's inception, ho\vever, ST had to reorganize the core development 
team. The reorganized team retained only one person from the original team, and another year and 
a half was required to "qualify" the new process in the development fab.22 The project thus was 
delayed by roughly one year. As \ye noted earlier, the costs of late entry in most segments of the 
semiconductor industry are high, and these delays in the process development project ultimately 
imposed serious commercial penalties on ST. 
In retrospect, ST management ackno\vledged that the decision to pursue such an ambitious 
new process technology for this particular product was a mistake. Rather than developing a 
22 Within ST, "qualfication" of the process meant that the process was meeting its die and line yicld 
targets. It also indicated that all modules were characterized sufficiently to facilitate the operation of the 
process within the development fab as a benchmark and to support its transfer to the manufacturing site. 
technically demanding new process and new product simultaneously, managers argued that a 
"shrink" of an existing product should have been the focus of a less ambitious process development 
project, enabling the manufacture of a new product on a process with fewer radically new steps. 
Some of the new steps thus could have been incorporated into ST's volume manufacturing 
operations before the development of this new product began, and ST would have entered the 
market sooner. Rather than approaching the development of this process as one part of a portfolio 
of process and product capabilities that would be enhanced over the next several years, ST 
undertook an ambitious "moon-shot" effort for this single process and product. 
Development and transfer to manufacturing of a less radically new process into its volume 
manufacturing facilities also would have permitted more rapid learning and debugging of the new 
process. ST's development facility was small, with no more than one of several critical pieces of 
equipment. Capacity constraints quickly appeared and often increased the cycle time for 
completion of a mznufacturing lot or an experiment, slowing the evaluation of new process steps. 
The need to send chips to foreign facilities for packaging23 produced other delays. The 
development fab occasionally \\!as renliss in shpping h i shed  d e  to the assembly stage, and the 
distant packaging operation failed to assign a sufficiently high priority to the very small lots of test 
wafers and die shipped by ST. These problems delayed reliability and "bum-in" testing, which 
required packaged chips. The development team felt that the long cycle times of ST's development 
fab and assembly operations were a critical impediment in developing the new process. 
Development fab capacity was also constrained by the decision of ST senior management 
during the third year of the project to rely on this facility for production of small volumes for sale 
of the product that relied on the new process. S T  sought through this policy to overcome some of 
23 "Packaging" refers to the insertion of a die into a casing, usually made of plastic or ceramic, that can 
be inserted into a computer "motherboard" or some other board-level assembly for incorporation into an 
electronic systems product. 
the commercial penalties resulting from the delays in the development of the new process. The 
policy nevertheless may have produced hrther delays, since the new process had not yet been h l l y  
characterized, the installation of new equipment in the development fab diverted engineering effort, 
and as  new operators were hired and trained. 
Although its internal study of previous new process development projects did not prevent 
the firm from pursuing a project that was techmcally too ambitious, S T  used the study's findings to 
impose discipline over equipment selection and problem-solving within its process development 
activities. In parallel with the development of the new process, a senior S T  manager formed an 
equipment group with representatives from both the development and manufacturing facilities to 
consolidate and rationalize the company's production equipment set. Consolidation entailed 
coordinating all future equipment purchases across ST's fabs down to the model number, as  well 
as  the imposition of identicnl specifications for the fabs' chemicals, gases, and temperature 
settings. During its monthly meetings, the equipnlent group reviewrd the new equipment 
requirements of the process under development. The equipment group afforded the manufacturing 
facilities' engineers a voice in equipment selection, in order to increase their commitment to the 
success of the new process, while also providing them with a preview of the new process 
technology. 
In addition to their involvement in equipment decisions, ST's development engineers 
participated in three regularly scheduled meetings that dealt specifically with the process 
development project. A daily morning meeting was brief and informal, and consisted largely of 
reports from each of the engineers in the core development group on findings and new problem 
areas uncovered during the previous day. A second, weekly meeting was attended by ST's top 
management and representatives from the development team. The leader of the development team 
presented a formal status report on the team's progress against intermediate and long-term 
milestones and the primary obstacles. Managers from each process module attended the weekly 
meeting to field specific technical questions, and as the date of "qualification" of the process 
approached, managers fiom marketing and back-end operations, such as packaging, began to 
attend these meetings. A third regular meeting was a quarterly review attended by representatives 
from all of the company's manufacturing fabs, and was intended to provide detailed technical 
information on both the characteristics of the new process technology and its state of completion. 
At the quarterly review, the development team leader presented the results from the electrical and 
reliability tests, described the progress in developing each step of the new process, and responded 
to questions and requests for action fiom the previous quarterly meeting. Manufacturing fab 
representatives provided a number of suggestions, most of which sought to eliminate steps.24 
Although this description of the number of meetings indicates the importance assigned by 
senior S T  managers to the maintenance of good conununications between the development 
engineers and their counterparts at the volume fabs, cross-functional communication often was 
deficient. Serious commu~ication failures occurred between marketing and engineering and 
between "front-end'' engineering (making the chip) and "back-end" engineering (packaging and 
testing the chip). 
Well into the second year of developing this new process, ST had yet to fully commit to a 
specific size or capacity for the "cells," the building blocks within the chip that would be produced 
with the process. Although this key commitment usually is made by engineering and marketing 
staff at the outset of a project, as late as the beginning of the transfer of the new process 
technology from the development fab to the manufacturing site, discussions continued over possible 
changes in the size of the cell. The cell architecture for this memory chip was relatively simple by 
24 According to one of ST'S manufacturing fab managers, the ability of a manufacturing facility to 
absorb, learn, and "ramp" a new process declines significantly as a function of the number of steps In the 
process, and presumably does so even more dramatically as the number of new process steps grolvs. 
comparison with that of other products, such as microprocessors, and changes in its architecture 
therefore were less dsruptive. Nonetheless, ST'S delays in committing to a specific cell design 
added another layer of uncertainty to an already complex project. Engineering resources were 
diverted from the technical problems associated with the process flow and committed instead to 
studies of the technical tradeoffs associated with each proposed cell type, with little participation 
from marketing personnel. 
Another critical decision that was deferred or changed late in the process development 
project concerned the identity of the recipient production fab for this new process. The recipient 
fab was shifted no more than 6 months before transfer commenced, an especially risky policy in 
view of the fact that the newly chosen recipient fab was equipped to process wafers of a different 
diameter than the developnlent fab. 
This development project violated a number of the procedures that had been recommended 
in ST'S internal study, including the directive to avoid shifting the identity of the recipient fab late 
in the development project, and the requirement for maximum compatibility in equipment sets 
between recipient and development fab, including comparable wafer diameters. The firm plans to 
conduct a more extensive "post-mortem" study of the project that will develop another set of 
guidelines for the nest project. But ST'S difficulties with this project s u a e s t  that additional study 
will not suffice to improve its management of new process development and introduction. The 
project suffered from overly ambitious goals and a failure to link process and product development 
strategies more effectively in a timely fashion. Coordination between marketing and engineering at 
an earlier stage in the development cycle remains a major challenge. Although the development 
project ultimately succeeded, poor cross-functional communication reflects another longstanding 
problem at ST: its reliance on heroic efforts by individuals, rather than team-based problem- 
solving throughout the development cycle. 
B. Multiplex Electronics 
A central characteristic of new process introduction at ME is the breadth and depth of the 
firm's efforts to achieve precise duplication of process and equipment specifications between 
development and manufacturing and across all sites running a particular process.25 By instituting 
company-wide duplication of equipment, materials, automation systems, and statistical process 
control procedures, ME ensures the reliability of its chips and manufacturing processes. Achieving 
this level of duplication was costly; the company took approximately six years to fully implement 
its duplication strategy. To facilitate the acceptance of its duplication strategy, ME formed teams 
with multi-site membership to select equipment and approve process changes. ME also has 
overlapped development with manufacturing to the greatest degree of any of the companies whose 
new process development practices we studied in detail, in order to support more precise 
duplication between development and production, while cutting the ramp time at the volume 
recipient fab. 
ME strives to avoid the difficulties that ST experienced with the simultaneous introduction 
of a new process and a new product design by following strict new process introduction procedures 
that extend across multiple generations of a given product and process. The first version of a new 
product design typically is a relatively large die size, and it is manufactured with a process that has 
been developed for a prior-generation device. The first "shrink" of this new product, however, is 
designed under the supervision of the development staff, and its production relies on a process that 
incorporates more new steps. Thus, an all-new product relies on a process that is relatively well- 
understood, and a substantially new process is used only for the manufacture of a product design 
whose general performance and manufacturability are relatively well-understood. Another stark 
contrast with S T  is ME'S effort to attain at least 70% overlap in steps and in equipment 
25 Due to altitude and temperature differences between their fabs, ME permits some variation in the 
process specifications across its sites. 
requirements across process generations. ME generally undertakes major technical revisions of 
process modules only with the inception of a new process development project. ME managers 
stated that forecasting design rules and process technology requirements more than one generation 
into the fiture is simply too difficult. 
ME has adopted an unusual approach to new process development that combines the 
process development and early-stage, commercial-scale manufacturing activities in a single 
"hybrid" facility. The development and early-stage volume production of each successive new 
product take place within a fab constructed specifically for that process. Rather than developing a 
new process in a specialized development facility and then transferring it to a volume 
manufacturing site, ME develops a new process in the hybrid facility, where it is eventually 
irnplemcnted a t  commercial scale. No  transfer therefore is needed prior to the achievement of 
commercial production volumes; complete equipment duplicatioil between the development and 
early-stage volume manufacturing is guaranteed; and several members of the development team for 
each project typically remain \vith the process once it is "ran~ped up" in this new facility. 
Eventually, several months after the process has been ramped up in the hybrid facility, it is 
transferred to a very high-volume production facility. This transfer requires substantial personnel 
rotation and equipment duplication. The new process remains in operation in the hybrid facility for 
at least 12 months after the transfer, in order to provide a production baseline for the very high- 
volume facility. 
The M E  strategy for new process introduction has shifted power and responsibility for a 
broad range of activities within the firm to its process development group. Development within 
M E  now is responsible for designing and constructing new manufacturing capacity both a t  the 
development site and the high-volume manufacturing site, and for hiring technicians and engineers 
to sustain the process baseline. Surprisingly, in view of its large investment in policies for ensuring 
a relatively smooth development and transfer of new process technologies, ME does not emphasize 
design for manufacturability in the first generation of a new product offering. ME's circuit design 
group finalizes the design rules at an early stage in the development of manufacturing process 
technology, and the development group is charged with developing a process to meet those rules 
(the design of "shrinks" of a new product, as we noted earlier, nonetheless is the responsibility of 
the process development group). The manufacturing fabs contribute very little to changes in design 
rules, since development and early commercial-scale production occur at the development site. 
Although the high-volume manufacturing sites eventually do become involved in negotiating with 
the development group over the transfer, the development group has selected and developed the 
new modules for a new product well before manufacturing engineers become involved. 
For each new process, ME brings production personnel from its very high-volume 
commercial manufacturing facilities to the development site for six months to a year to assist in 
"ramping" the new process in the hybrid fab. The integration engineers from the recipient fab are 
the first to make the trip, followed by engineers and technicians from each equipment module. 
Compared with the development fabs at ST, ME's development fab produces up to seven times 
more wafers per week at the tinle of the transfer to the production facility. Indeed, the peak 
capacity of ME's dedicated hybrid fab for some processes is comparable to that of several of ST'S 
commercial-volume facilities. 
"Ramping" production volume in its development fab has several advantages for ME. 
Personnel from the production fabs acquire the experience at the hybrid fab to run a high-volume 
ramp more efficiently when they return to their very high-volume facility. Requests from the 
recipient fab for changes in the equipment set or the process recipes are reduced by the involvement 
of many of the fab's engineering staff on the first ramp of the process. The othenvise detrimental 
effects of the geographic separation of the very high-volume commercial manufacturing facility 
from the development site are reduced through rotation of personnel between these sites. Since the 
first production ranlp occurs at the hybrid fab, development engineers stay involved with the new 
process through a ramping exercise and are able to resolve manufacturing problems that are 
revealed only at commercial-scale volumes. The high costs of new equipment for the development 
facility are charged to manufacturing, rather than to development, and purchases of multiple pieces 
of each type of equipment are amortized across these relatively high production volumes. The 
ability to effectively develop a new process in the relatively large-volume hybrid facility thus 
reduces many of the capacity constraints that slowed the rate of learning for ST in its process 
development, and the higher volumes reveal certain classes of problems that otherwise would 
remain hidden from the developnlent engineers. Finally, ME'S strategy accelerates the achievement 
of sufficient production volumes of reliable chips that can be marketed to select customers and 
provided as samples to other purchasers. 
The hand-off to the high-volume manufacturing fab commences when the hybrid fab has 
begun increasing its onn production volunle. Before the hand-off, the source and recipient fabs 
negotiate "boundary guidelines and conditions" that guide each step of the transfer, describing all 
procedures and recipes in detail. Discussions between development and n~anufacturing over the 
process transfer center on recipe optimization, maintenance procedures, manufacturing goals, and 
transfer deliverables, and include e ~ ~ e n s i v e  documentation. By the time of transfer, a large binder 
containing all of the specifications of the new process is compiled, based in part on the experience 
of the development team in ramping the new process in this hybrid fab. An important section of 
the binder describes failure patterns, in order to provide guidance in trouble-shooting to 
manufacturing fab engineers. 
During the transfer, the recipient fab can apply for a waiver to a particular "boundary 
condition," but without compelling data, waivers related to process steps or recipes are not 
allo~ved. Equipment changes are rarely allowed under the waiver system, although changes in 
materials or chemical inputs are allowed more frequently. When the source and the recipient fab 
reach an impasse regarding the specifications of a step, a corporate oversight committee resolves 
the conflict. This committee also oversees transfers of process technologies among the very high- 
volume production fabs operated by ME. 
ME typically organizes the transfer team responsible for moving a new process from the 
hybrid to the commercial production fab six to eight months prior to certification of a new process 
in the hybrid fab. Both the development and recipient fabs contribute members to the team, which 
has twenty to thirty members. The core team is divided into five subteams that focus on the major 
equipment modules: photo, implant, thin films, etch, and metallization. Both the team and 
subteams are cross-hnctional ones; each subteam has at least one equipment engineer and at least 
one process engineer. A test engineer is also a member of the team. In addition, one to two team 
members concentrate on human resources issues such as what training \$dl be needed by operators 
at the recipient fab in order to run the new process. In contrast to this practice, ST did not assign a 
high priority to the training of operators or technicians within their process hand-off regimen. 
ME has aggressive goals for new process hand-offs: the very high-volume recipient fab is 
expected to attain yields that are within 1% of the hybrid development fab's last yield at the time of 
the transfer.26 This aggressive goal relies on the estensive overlap of manufacturing and 
development activities and personnel described above. Over two hundred test wafers are partially 
processed by both the source and recipient fabs during the transfer, to verify the process and its 
transfer. M E  also closely monitors the rate at which the volume production fab expands its weekly 
wafer starts. 
26 At the time of release to volume manufacturing, ME wishes to achieve a defect density of 0.2 per crn2 
at its development site. 
ME seeks precise duplication of all aspects of manufacturing processes aniong its very 
high-volume production facilities operating a given process. ME's equipment group began a 
program more than six years ago to develop a consistent equipment set across its very high-volume 
fabs and to present a united corporate front in negotiations with equipment vendors. The 
equipment group looks five years behind and ten years ahead when making equipment 
recommendations to the company. When the equipment group receives a request from development 
to purchase a new machine, a selection team is designated. The selection team contacts the major 
suppliers and determines which supplier can best deliver the desired processing capability. ME 
prefers buying equipment "off the shelf," and will resist modifications in some pieces of equipment 
that threaten exact duplication among its production sites--in some instances, this policy has 
delayed adoption of equipment advances. \+%en negotiating with one of its primary vendors, ME 
coordinates discussioiz across process generations, discussing both hture  needs and the 
performance of the vendor's equipment currently installed in ME'S manufacturing and development 
sites. Sending their vendors a "single message" has strengthened the firm's "engagement" with 
their vendors, according to ME managers. Complenienting the efforts of the company-wide 
equipment group, user groups are formed ~ i t h  membership drawn from ME's production sites. 
The user group for a particular tool decides on upgrades and negotiates with the vendor on how to 
implement them. 
ME'S efforts to achieve precise duplication of manufacturing processes across its fabs rely 
on tight, comrnittee-based control of changes in any aspect of these processes. The recipient fab 
and all of ME'S fabs that subsequently receive the process can propose changes resulting fiom 
experimentation in the manufacturing facilities, but the process-change committee must approve all 
changes before their adoption. The committee then disseminates the new process specification to 
all fabs running the process. The composition of the committee changes over the life of a specific 
manufacturing process. Initially, the development organization plays a major role, but as the new 
process migrates to several high-volume manufacturing facilities, one is designated as the 
custodian of the baseline process and the development organization's role within the committee is 
reduced.27 
The evolution of ME'S approach to new process development and introduction has relied in 
part on systematic efforts to learn from successive projects. ME follows a rigorous "post-mortem" 
exercise by which they review each phase of the development cycle to learn how they can improve. 
The post-mortem team drafts a memo detailing the issues and corrective actions, and distributes it 
to the team working on the next new process development project. 
V. Capabilities, routines and common themes in management 
of new process introduction 
The focus of this paper is the firm-level capabilities or routines that influence performance 
in new process introduction, a classic case of the creation and replication of a very complex, 
uncertain set of procedures \vithin the boundaries of the firm. The procedures involve phenomena 
that are not well understood and knowledge that is highly tacit. Moreover, management of the 
transfer of new process technologies is a relatively new requirement within the semiconductor 
industry. Significant increases in the complexity of this industry's process and product 
technologies during the past 15 years have intensified the need for a more systematic approach to 
new process development and transfer--indeed, the very concept of a separate development facility 
has become widespread within the industry only since the mid-1970s. 
We find little evidence within the U.S. and non-U.S. semiconductor manufacturing 
industries to support the view that process technology is ignored by managers concerned with 
27 The development fab runs the baseline for at least a year after the transfer to the initial high-volume 
site. Then the process is likely transferred to an additional very high-volume site, and the initial recipient 
maintains the baseline process. 
competitive perfomlance; managers in this industry devote considerable effort and attention to 
improving their management of new process development and introduction. Rather than 
managerial inattention, we believe that it is the sheer complesity of managing intrafirm 
development and replication of process technologies that is responsible for significant interfirm 
performance differences. In this section, we analyze the approaches taken by semiconductor 
producers to manage new process introduction, in order to better illustrate the sources and nature 
of the firm-level capabilities or routines that may underpin them. 
A striking element of similarity between the firms that we studied in detail was their focus 
on avoiding repetition of past mistakes by learning from them. Both ST and ME had conducted 
studies of previous new process development and transfer projects and had implemented changes 
based on the conclusions of those studies. ME was far more systematic in this self-study process, 
conducting detailed retrospective reviews of each major project and continuously adjusting the 
structure of their policies for management of new process introduction in response. ST, on the 
other hand, had undertaken only one comprehensive retrospective study that spanned a number of 
projects. Although this study led to significant changes and improveinents in ST's management of 
new process introduction, it did not address several fiindamental issues, and the resulting pressures 
on ST's process development project may have contributed to the firm's failure to adhere strictly to 
the study's guidelines. One normative conclusion about the development of firm-level capabilities 
that seems to be supported by this small sample of cases is the importance of continuous efforts to 
learn from experience--the firms that have performed best in this complex activity are those that 
have systematically gathered retrospective performance data on a series of projects. 
ME'S internal studies emphasized the importance of strategic integration of new process 
and new product development programs through a plan that spanned a number of product and 
process generations. Semiconductor producers need product and equipment "roadrnaps," which 
lay out the next several generations of a company's products in a given line of business or product 
line, detailing plans for alternating between the introduction of "shriilks" of established products 
and entirely new product designs. At the same time, such a plan must guide the development and 
introduction of new generations of process technologies, which in turn impose requirements for 
equipment purchases that will span multiple generations. 28 Implementing the roadrnaps requires 
support from senior management, as well as close coordination among integration engineers, 
module developers, and a company-wide equipment group. 
Because the integration of these functions is most logically undertaken by the process 
development organization, the increasing importance of effective managenlent of new process 
introduction appears to be expanding the power and authority of the process development 
organizations, relative to both product design and manufacturing, within both of the firms we 
studied in detail. T l i s  expansion of the power of the development orgailization seems particularly 
note\vorthy in the sphere of manufacturing. Engineers at the recipient fabs in both finns are 
expected to avoid any undocumented "t\veaking" of the process once it has been transferred to thcir 
facilities. Moreover, both firms exercise controls of varying degrees of stringency over equipment 
choices in their recipient fabs. The controls enable the finns to maintain high levels of equipment 
duplication between the development and recipient fab, and among the various manufacturing 
facilities that are operating identical pieces of equipment. 
The effort to maintain discipline within new process introduction thus can discourage 
creativity and problem-solving activities within the manufacturing operations of these firms, an 
outcome that could be very detrimental to manufacturing performance. In addition, of course, the 
ability of a development facility to replicate all aspects of the high-volume inanufacturing 
environment is limited. ME insisted on precise duplication of all process steps and equipment to  
28 A large share of capital expenditures goes to equipment. Currently, high volume fabs cost around $1 
billion, with 85 percent spent on equipment and 15 percent on facilities. 
the greatest degree, but even ME permits changes to the process specifications that are approved 
by a corporate review committee. Nonetheless, the resulting disincentives for creativity within the 
manufacturing fabs may eventually create problems in recruiting and retaining engineering talent in 
these operations. Similarly, the insistence on equipment duplication has high costs--when a new 
process is introduced, older equipment may be scrapped before the end of its useful life. Moreover, 
delaying the use of new equipment until a complete set can be installed in both the development and 
recipient fabs, or until precise duplication is possible among all of a firm's manufacturing fabs, 
may slow the adoption of state-of-the-art equipment. The fact that firms are willing to incur these 
potentially high costs is indicative of the importance assigned to equipment duplication, which in 
turn indicates the extraordinary uncertainty that attends process developnlent and transfer. 
The increased importance of effective management of new process development and 
transfer that is responsible for the growing authority of the developmerit organizations within these 
firms has important implications for the organization of the development organization itself. We 
noted in our earlier discussion that development fab capacity constraints are a serious problem in 
the development of a new manufacturing process, since they can slow the rate of learning. But 
these constraints are exacerbated by the requirement within many firms that a new process be 
operated within the development fab as a "benchmark" for months after its transfer to a volume 
manufacturing site. Operation of a new manufacturing process as a benchmark in the same facility 
that has responsibility for developing the next one requires a substantial investment in equipment 
and trained operators. The firms in our case studies addressed this requirement in different ways. 
The S T  development fab was ordered to begin to show a positive revenue stream by manufacturing 
larger quantities of products from the new process in a far more disciplined fashion. But the 
complexity of this new manufacturing process meant that the development team simultaneously 
had to complete development of the process while producing commercially viable components. 
Rather than a benchmark, ST'S new process Ivas still under developnlent when it first began 
producing components for sale, and the rate of learning suffered. ME overcame development fab 
capacity constraints by developing the new process in a hybrid commercial-scale facility and 
continued operation of the new process in that facility for some months after its development and 
transfer to a very high-volume production facility. 
All of the companies we studied in detail, and most of the firms in the larger CSM project, 
exchange personnel among their research group, their development group, and their manufacturing 
fab receiving the new process. Although documentation with detailed process specifications often 
travels with the people between each stage, the written word cannot serve as a perfect substitute for 
personal experience. Frequently the documentation provides details on only a single process step 
and does not describe all of the unsuccessful experiments leading to the adopted recipe. The details 
of the experiments that did not work are often only logged in an individual engineer's lab book or 
memory, requiring that person's presence during transfer. 
Generally, the lland-off between development and manufacturing poses a more difficult 
problem of acceptance than the hand-off behieen fundamental research and the development 
organization. The realities of a high-volume manufacturing fab rarely match those of a small scale 
development fab, as we noted earlier--up to ten times as many wafers run through a volume fab 
relative to a development fab, requiring possible revisions to the new process, particularly in the 
equipment calibration and maintenance areas. By bringing manufacturing engineers to the 
development fab before the new process is frozen for transfer, a company can incorporate the 
suggestions of the manufacturing personnel and heighten the likelihood that the manufacturing staff 
will accept o~nersh ip  of the new process. The complexities of long-distance transfer of a new 
process from development to recipient fab have led an increasing number of semiconductor firms 
now to co-locate their development and manufacturing facilities; the results of our statistical 
analysis suggest that this policy should improve performance. If this strategy is widely adopted, 
centers for semiconductor RRrD, such as California's Silicon Valley, could witness the departure 
of development organizations for the rapidly growing manufacturing sites in Tesas, the Southwest, 
or the Pacific Northwest. 
VI. Conclusion 
Students of firm-level capabilities emphasize the persistence of differences in performance, 
as well as behavior, among firms in the same industry that are not well addressed by other 
approaches, such as neoclassical economics or the structure-conduct approach to strategy 
developed by Porter (1980). This view also stresses the "embedded" nature of such capabilities-- 
they develop out of idiosyncratic investments and processes, and competitors find it difficult to 
duplicate them through imitation or other types of interfirm "spillovers." Although this view of the 
firm appeals to intuition and casual empiricism, it is difficult to prove or disprove through 
empirical testing. Measures of firm-specific capabilities are difficult to collect on a large scale, 
and the performance consequences of differenczs in such capabilities are not easily determined. 
This paper has examined one of the most important firm-specific capabilities for 
competition in the semiconductor industry: the ability of firms to develop, introduce, and espand 
production with new processes. A firm that is slow to espand the output of a new product, or 
introduces a new product with a very poorly characterized manufacturing process, faces severe 
cost and profit penalties. Despite its legitimate claim to be a high-technology industry, knowledge 
of the precise details of many semiconductor manufacturing processes is so limited that their 
performance cannot be predicted without extensive experimentation. This characteristic of the 
process technology makes it highly tacit and means that firm-level differences in managing new 
process introduction are likely to persist and nil1 have important consequences for performance. 
One of the major challenges in new process introduction is the intrafirm transfer of a 
complex technology. The movement of a new manufacturing process from its origins in a 
dedicated development facility to a commercial production site is very demanding, and requires 
exqensive planning and investment. The transfer of a manufacturing process among cornmercial- 
scale production facilities, which involves a process technology that is more mature, well- 
understood, and stable, also is a major challenge. Moreover, the capabilities that are exploited by 
firms to manage new process introduction cannot be reduced to differences in human capital. The 
skills seem to be organizational, rather than exclusively individual. One firm's hiring the most 
skilled process engineers of another firm may be necessary, but it is not sufficient, to "reverse 
engineer" and introduce a new manufacturing process. 
Like new product development, new process introduction is an element of high-technology 
con~petition in \vhich management and organization matter at least as much as basic technological 
knowledge or even the technical skills of the \\lorkforce. Moreover, one of the most important 
characteristics of firms that are relatively successful in new process introduction is precisely the 
coordination of new product and new process development strategies. The case studies of 
individual firms' management of new process introduction emphasize the importance of developing 
a strategy for both process and product technologies at the very early stages of "product definition" 
(Bacon et a]., 1994). But these plans also must extend across several generations or even several 
families of products, so as to avoid the requirement to develop an ambitious new product and 
process simultaneously. The demands of new process introduction for equipment selection, 
characterization, and standardization within a firm also mean that collaboration between 
manufacturers and their equipment suppliers can yield significant payoffs. Indeed, this type of 
"vertical" collaboration now is a central mission of the U.S. semiconductor R&D consortium, 
SEMATECH, and has proven to be easier to sustain than collaboration among manufacturers on 
developing a "benchmark" process technology (Grindley et al., 1994). 
An important issue for further research concerns the apparent contrast between the 
development of process technologies in the chemicals and semiconductor industries. U.S. 
chemicals manufacturers relied heavily on semi-scale "pilot plants" during the 1920-60 period for 
developing new manufacturing processes, because they were operating with technologies 
characterized by high levels of uncertainty. During the past 25 years, however, more ex-?ensive use 
of computer simulations and other techniques appear to have reduced the importance of pilot 
plants. The chemicals industry also is characterized by high levels of interfirm licensing of process 
technologies. The pattern of development of process technology in the semiconductor industry 
presents a significant contrast--semi-scale development plants have become much more important 
as the process technologies have become more complex. Moreover, licensing of process 
technologies (as opposed to designs) appears to be less widespread. The reasons for these 
contrasting patteins of development in two of the most technology-intensive modem manufacturing 
industries merit hrther investigation. 
Evaluation of the strategies through which firms strengthen or erode their capabilities in 
such critical functions as new process introduction also merits additional work. Longitudinal data 
on the performance of a single firm or group of firnls, along with more detailed data on the 
management and organization of their process development activities, are needed to answer this 
question. Our case studies provide a snapshot, rather than a history of new process development in 
two semiconductor manufacturers, but they do strongly suggest that one of the most important 
factors in firms' improvement of their management of new process introduction is the ability to 
learn through systematic retrospective assessments of previous projects. Both of the firms in our 
case studies had undertaken systematic studies of their previous performance, and both attempted, 
with varying degrees of success, to learn from past successes and failures. 
Systematic collection and assessment of performance data are critical to the day-to-day 
management of mature semiconductor manufacturing processes. Our research suggests that such 
data collection, review, and learning are no less essential to improving performance in new process 
introduction, an activity of growing competitive importance in this industry. Inasmuch as the 
technology of semiconductor manufacturing recently has "outrun" the progress of scientific 
understanding of the underlying properties of these complex processes, manufacturers must 
develop capabilities to support incremental learning and reduce the risks attendant on the 
development and transfer of the new process technologies that are indispensable to competitive 
success in this industry. 
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Figure 4:  Simulated Penalties for Poor Starts Among 4 IvIB DRAM Processes 
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Table 2: Performance Measures for New Processes 
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